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Paskowitz: Constitutional Rights of Noncommercial Boycotters: A Delicate Bal

NOTES

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF
NONCOMMERCIAL BOYCOTTERS: A
DELICATE BALANCE
The power to boycott1 has long been one of the most potent

weapons in the arsenal of special interest groups seeking to achieve
social or political change.2 Because of the economic discomfiture
such boycotts inevitably cause, boycott targets have often sought le-

gal redress by arguing that boycotts are restraints of trade in violation of the antitrust laws3 or that the tactics used by a particular

group of boycotters gives rise to a cause of action in tort. Because
1. For the purposes of this note, "boycott" is defined as "a method of pressuring a party
with whom one has a dispute by withholding, or enlisting others to withhold, patronage or
services from the target." St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry, 438 U.S. 531, 541 (1978)
(footnote omitted). The term "boycott" was derived from a method of retaliation used in 1880
against a land agent, Charles Boycott, who paid starvation wages to his tenants and evicted
those who complained. The outraged tenants rallied the support of Boycott's servants, herders,
and drivers, and all agreed to cease relations with the Boycott family. Missouri v. NOW, 620
F.2d 1301, 1304 n.5 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 842 (1980).
2. The best-known illustration of the effectiveness of such boycotts was the refusal of
black citizens of Montgomery, Alabama to patronize a bus company that practiced racially
discriminatory policies. See M.L. KING, STRIDE TOWARD FREEDOM (1958).
3. E.g., Missouri v. NOW, 620 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 842 (1980);
Osborn v. Pennsylvania-Delaware Serv. Station Dealers Ass'n, 499 F. Supp. 553 (D. Del.
1980). Section one of the Sherman Act states: "Every contract, combination in the form of
trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States,
or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). Group boycotts have
been held to fall within the proscriptive language of this section as combinations in restraint of
trade. Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959); Fashion Originators'
Guild, Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
4. See, e.g., Missouri v. NOW, 620 F.2d 1301, 1316 (8th Cir.) (secondary boycott giving rise to claim of tortious intentional infliction of economic harm without legal justification
or excuse), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 842 (1980); NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 393 So. 2d
1290, 1301 (Miss. 1980) (tortious intentional infliction of economic harm through use of violent acts), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 565 (1981); Southern Christian Leadership Conference v.
A.G. Corp., 241 So. 2d 619 (Miss. 1970) (tortious conspiracy to cause economic harm through
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special interest group boycotts contain an expressive element5 that is

lacking in commercial boycotts," serious questions have arisen as to
whether such boycotts can be enjoined or damages assessed without
7
infringing the participants' first amendment rights.
Some courts have dealt with this constitutional problem by at-

tempting to balance the government's interest in economic regulation
against the boycotters' interest in unfettered expression.8 Others
have rejected such a balancing test and maintained that boycotters
possess an unequivocal right to persuade others not to deal for political reasons." Still others have taken a more restrictive view, treating
use of violence and secondary boycott).
5. See Missouri v. NOW, 620 F.2d 1301, 1315-19 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 842 (1980); Osborn v. Pennsylvania-Delaware Serv. Station Dealers Ass'n, 499 F. Supp.
553, 557-58 (D. Del. 1980); Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp. v. Waldman, 486 F. Supp. 759,
767-69 (M.D. Pa.), rev'd on other grounds, 634 F.2d 127 (3d Cir. 1980); Note, NOW or
Never: Is There Antitrust Liabilityfor Noncommercial Boycotts? 80 COLUM. L. REv. 1317,
1330-39 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Note, NOW or Never]; Note, PoliticalBoycott Activity
and the First Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REv. 659, 676-87 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Note,
Political Boycott].
6. The Supreme Court has uniformly held that group boycotts undertaken for commercial purposes are per se violations of the Sherman Act. See, e.g., Klor's Inc. v. Broadway-Hale
Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212 (1959); Fashion Originators' Guild, Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457,
467-68 (1941).
7. The first amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits Congress from making laws "abridging the freedom of speech." U.S. CoNsr. amend. I. For a discussion of the
constitutional issues raised by noncommercial boycott cases, see infra notes 123-74 and accompanying text.
8. This approach was first employed in 1980 in Osborn v. Pennsylvania-Delaware Serv.
Station Dealers Ass'n, 499 F. Supp. 553 (D. Del. 1980) and in Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp.
v. Waldman, 486 F. Supp. 759 (M.D. Pa.), rev'd on other grounds, 634 F.2d 127 (3d Cir.
1980), and was strongly advocated in the dissenting opinion in Missouri v. NOW, 620 F.2d
1301, 1324-26 (8th Cir. 1980) (Gibson, J., dissenting).
9. The view that there is an expansive constitutional right to boycott has been most fully
developed in a group of Fifth Circuit cases. Kirkland v. Wallace, 403 F.2d 413 (5th Cir. 1968)
involved a constitutional challenge to an Alabama statute that prohibited printing or circulating any notice of boycott, or declaring that a boycott existed against any person or association.
Id. at 414. The circuit court, in striking down the statute, stated: "Extended discussion is
hardly necessary to show the patent invalidity of a statute such as [this]. Clearly, on its face,
this statute prohibits actions protected by the First Amendment, and this overbreadth of coverage is fatal." Id. at 416 (emphasis added).
The Fifth Circuit's view that boycotters deserve broad constitutional protection was further developed in Machesky v. Bizzell, 414 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1969). In Machesky, a civil
rights boycott had been enjoined following several acts of violence associated with the boycott
effort. Id. at 285. Noting that the injunction prohibited "loitering or congregating . . . to
induce, persuade, or coerce any person or persons not to trade or to do other business with. ..
[c]omplainants," the court overturned the injunction as constitutionally unsound. Id. at 291.
Judge Bell wrote:
This, for aught else appearing, prohibits the distribution of leaflets or even speech
directed toward the boycott effort. [Such a prohibition] is constitutionally overbroad
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0 as similar to commercial combinations in
noncommercial boycotts
1

restraint of trade. "

These approaches 12 have tended to focus primarily on the
boycotters' interest in expressing themselves economically and on the
public's interest in maintaining a competitive market.' 3 Little attention has been paid to the target's right to be free from economic
coercion. This lack of sensitivity to the interests of the individual
targets has led those jurisdictions that afford boycotters broad constitutional protection to sanction the imposition of severe economic4
hardship on parties only tangentially related to the dispute at hand.'
in that it lumps the protected with the unprotected in such a way as to abridge

important public interests in the full dissemination of public expression on public
issues.
Id.
10.

For the purposes of this note, boycotts will be considered "noncommercial" when the

boycotters are not business entities and are not acting to increase their profits. See Note,

NOW or Never, supra note 5, at 1319.
11. See Council of Defense v. International Magazine Co., 267 F. 390, 411-12 (8th Cir.
1920); New York v. Horsemen's Benevolent & Protective Ass'n, 55 A.D. 2d 251, 389
N.Y.S.2d 868 (1976). This approach has been taken by courts that endorse a literal application of the antitrust laws and give little weight to the proposition that actions resulting in a
restraint of trade may merit constitutional protection. For example, in New York v. Horsemen's Benevolent & Protective Ass'n, 55 A.D.2d 251, 389 N.Y.S.2d 868 (1976), an action was
brought under New York's antitrust statute, N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 340 (McKinney 1968),
against an association of horse owners and trainers who withdrew their horses from racing to
protest the state's failure to finance a pension plan for its members. The boycott's intent to
communicate the group's displeasure with a legislative policy did not weigh heavily with the
court, which held that "[t]his was not merely an attempt to influence legislation but a boycott"
and thus enjoinable under the applicable antitrust law. 55 A.D.2d at 254, 389 N.Y.S.2d at 869
(citations omitted).
For commentary asserting that noncommercial boycotts may be constitutionally prohibited, see Note, Political Boycott, supra note 5, at 686-87; Note, Protest Boycotts Under the
Sherman Act, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 1131, 1144-48 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Note, Protest
Boycotts].
12. Because of the paucity of decisions dealing with this question and the divergent
views of those few cases that have dealt with it, it cannot be said that any of the above enumerated approaches constitutes a majority view.
13. See, e.g., Machesky v. Bizzell, 414 F.2d 283, 291 (5th Cir. 1969); Osborn v. Pennsylvania-Delaware Serv. Station Dealers Ass'n, 499 F. Supp. 553, 556 (D. Del. 1980); Crown
Cent. Petroleum Corp. v. Waldman, 486 F. Supp. 759, 769 (M.D. Pa.), rev'd on other
grounds, 634 F.2d 127 (3d Cir. 1980); New York v. Horsemen's Benevolent and Protective
Ass'n, 55 A.D.2d 251, 389 N.Y.S.2d 868 (1976).
14. See, e.g., Missouri v. NOW, 620 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 842
(1980); Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp. v. Waldman, 486 F. Supp. 759 (M.D. Pa.), rev'd on
other grounds, 634 F.2d 127 (3d Cir. 1980).
The undesirability of allowing economic action to be taken against parties who are essentially neutral has been noted in passing by several commentators. See, e.g., Coons, Non-Commercial Purposeas a Sherman Act Defense, 56 Nw. U.L. REV. 705, 749 n.123 (1962); Note,
Protest Boycotts, supra note 11, at 1159. It was also forcefully argued by the unsuccessful

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1982

3

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 3 [1982], Art. 5

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 10:773

These results indicate the need for a test that will balance the
boycotters' constitutional interests not only against those of the government in maintaining competition in the marketplace but also
against those of the individual who finds himself an economic pawn
in a battle in which he has no stake. This note examines the nature
of the constitutional right that adheres to noncommercial boycotters,
and proposes a framework for analysis in which the primary consideration in gauging the extent of that right is the relationship between
the target and the boycotters' grievance. Included in this framework
is the notion that where the target's relationship to the grievance is

tenuous, the governmental interest in prohibiting the boycott is far
greater than where a more direct relationship exists.
THE

BOYCOTT AT COMMON LAW1 5

It has long been recognized that a merchant has a property
right to conduct his business without interference by a third party,
and that such interference may give rise to a cause of action in
tort.16 One of the essential elements of this tort action, however, has
plaintiff in Missouri v. NOW, 620 F.2d at 1312.
15. For a more extensive discussion of this topic, see Coons, supra note 13, at 713-26;
Note, The Consumer Boycott, 42 Miss. L.J. 226, 234-38 (1971); Note, The Common-Law and
Constitutional Status of Anti-Discrimination Boycotts, 66 YALE L.J. 397, 398-404 (1957)
[hereinafter cited as Note, The Common-Law].
16. Boycotts were often proscribed as constituting such interference. See, e.g., Ertz v.
Produce Exch. Co., 79 Minn. 140, 81 N.W. 737 (1900) (boycott of commodities merchant by
suppliers); Finnegan v. Butler, 112 Misc. 280, 182 N.Y.S. 671 (Sup. Ct. 1920) (enjoining
pendente lite group boycott by newspaper publishers of newsdealers who dealt with competitor); Boutwell v. Mart, 71 Vt. 1, 42-A. 607 (1899) (trade association liable for urging members to boycott nonmember merchants). See generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
OF TORTS §§ 129-30 (4th ed. 1971).
The tort of interference with prospective economic advantage has been codified in section
766B of the Restatement:
One who intentionally and improperly interferes with another's prospective contractual relation . . . is subject to liability to the other for the pecuniary harm resulting from loss of the benefits of the relation, whether the interference consists of
(a) inducing or otherwise causing a third party not to enter into or continue the
prospective relation or
(b) preventing the other from acquiring or continuing the prospective relation.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766B (1977). For recent applications of this rule, see M
& M Rental Tools, Inc. v. Milchem, Inc., 94 N.M. 449, 612 P.2d 241 (1980); Glenn v. Point
Park College, 441 Pa. 474, 272 A.2d 895 (1971).
The primary concern underlying the development of this tort was the protection of the
individual merchant's right to pursue his trade unimpeded, rather than a broad governmental
concern to preserve the public's right to a competitive market. In an early case illustrating this
concern, the court stated:
The common law has long recognized as a part of the boasted liberty of the citizen
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been the notion that boycotters or other violators can be held liable

only if their action was taken without justification.17 Although many
of the common law cases dealing with boycotts are of ancient vintage,18 the standards employed by the courts in gauging "justification" are highly relevant to modern constitutional analysis since such

determinations often rested on the strength of the government's interest in protecting the target. 19

Perhaps the clearest rule that can be gleaned from examining
these cases is that noncommercial boycotts with lawful objectives executed against a primary target 20 and unattended by violence or intimidation will not be enjoined.' In Watch Tower Bible & Tract
Society v. Dougherty,22 the defendants, leaders of a religious group,

instituted a boycott against a radio station and the department store
controlling the station in retaliation for broadcasts they believed at-

tacked their faith.23 Rejecting the claim that the boycott gave rise to
any action in tort, the court declared:
the right of every man to freely engage in such lawful business or occupation as he
himself may choose, free from hindrance or obstruction by his fellow men. . . . In a
civilized community which recognizes the right of private property among its institutions . . . a man should be protected by the law in the enjoyment of property once
it is acquired [and] in his efforts to acquire it.
Brennan v. United Hatters Local 17, 73 N. J. L. 729, 742, 65 A. 165, 170-71 (1906). See also
Annot., 9 A.L.R.2d 228 (1950).
17. See Missouri v. NOW, 620 F.2d 1301, 1316-19 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
842 (1980); W. PROSSER, supra note 16, § 129, at 942-46; Coons, supra note 14, at 713-14.
Those boycotts that are found to have been taken with justification are said to be "privileged."
Missouri v. NOW, 620 F.2d at 1319.
18. See, e.g., Gott v. Berea College, 156 Ky. 376, 161 S.W. 204 (1913); Watch Tower
Bible & Tract Soc'y v. Dougherty, 337 Pa. 286, 11 A.2d 147 (1940); Kuryer Publishing Co. v.
Messmer, 162 Wis. 565, 156 N.W. 948 (1916).
19. See Note, The Common-Law, supra note 15, at 398-400.
Under modern constitutional theory, expressive conduct such as a boycott cannot be regulated unless such regulation can be justified as necessary to further a "substantial" government
interest. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). Where courts have seen fit to
prohibit certain boycott actions, it is probable that a substantial governmental interest has
been found in restricting such conduct. Conversely, it may be said that where boycotts have
not been found actionable, the boycotters' interest in expressing themselves economically was
found to have vitiated (or at least counterbalanced) the plaintiffs' claims that there was a
substantial governmental interest in providing them protection.
20. For the purposes of this note, a "primary target" is defined as a party that engaged
in the conduct which led to the dispute at hand and that has the power to satisfy the boycotters' demands directly.
21. See, e.g., Watch Tower Bible & Tract Soc'y v. Dougherty, 337 Pa. 286, 11 A.2d
147 (1940); Kuryer Publishing Co. v. Messmer, 162 Wis. 565, 156 N.W. 948 (1916). See
generally Coons, supra note 14, at 713-21.
22. 337 Pa. 286, 11 A.2d 147 (1940).
23. Id. at 287, 11 A.2d at 148.
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cannot be mulcted in damages for protesting

against the utterances of one who they believe attacks their church
and misrepresents its teachings nor for inducing their adherents to
make similar protests. A right of action does not arise merely because a group withdraws its patronage or threatens to do so and
where the objects sought to be obinduces others to do 2likewise
4
tained are legitimate.

The view that boycotters have a right to engage in peaceful boycotting of primary targets persists so strongly through the common law
decisions that courts have felt compelled to reaffirm this principle
25
even where they have held the boycott at issue to be unlawful.
Where the target hit by a noncommercial boycott is only tangentially related to the dispute, courts have been willing to provide it
legal or equitable relief.28 In Southern ChristianLeadership Conference v. A.G. Corp.,27 for instance, the plaintiff was a white merchant
boycotted by a black civil rights group following a violent incident
between members of the group and the police. 28 The court held that
injunctive relief and damages were properly awarded, and that the
defendants' claim of constitutional protection was defeated by the
secondary nature of their actions:
The defendants argued that they were only exercising rights vouchsafed to them by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. . . . The
whole trouble in this case was that these defendants had no com24. Id. (citations omitted).
25. In Southern Christian Leadership Conference v. A.G. Corp., 241 So. 2d 619 (Miss.
1970), the court held the boycott unlawful because it was aimed at a secondary target and
accompanied by violence. The court also noted that: "Every member of this court agrees...
that the defendants had the right to peacefully meet, picket, march and boycott to secure
redress of their grievances and complaints specifically made against'particular employers or
businesses." Id. at 624 (dicta). In NAACP v. Webb's City, Inc., 152 So. 2d 179 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1963), vacated as moot, 376 U.S. 190 (1964). the court enjoined a picket in support of a
boycott because of its attendant violence but went on to note that: "The defendants had a right
to buy where they please and by concerted action to cease patronizing [plaintiff's business]
when they considered it to their interest to do so." Id. at 183 (dicta).
26. See Council of Defense v. International Magazine Co., 267 F. 390, 411-12 (8th Cir.
1920). But see Missouri v. NOW, 620 F.2d 1301, 1312 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 842
(1980); Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp. v. Waldman, 486 F. Supp. 759 (M.D. Pa.), rev'd on
other grounds, 634 F.2d 127 (3d Cir. 1980).
27. 241 So. 2d 619 (Miss. 1970).
28. Id. at 623. Following this incident, a boycott was launched against all local white
merchants to protest the discriminatory treatment of blacks by the white community. Id. at
620-26. The court found, however, that the SCLC had never alleged that the plaintiff had
conducted his business in a discriminatory manner. Id. at 624. Further, the court found that
no officer, stockholder, or employee of the plaintiff's business had participated in any way in
the violence that provided the initial impetus for the boycott. Id. at 623.
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plaint or grievance or even gripe [against] the appellee

. .

. [who]

was, in effect, an innocent bystander who ultimately became the
innocent victim of this struggle for political and economic power. 29
Some courts have also felt compelled to protect the target where
the economic action has been accompanied by threats, violence, or
intimidation. 30 A leading case in this area is NAACP v. Claiborne
Hardware Co.,31 a decision the Supreme Court has recently agreed
to review. Plaintiffs, storeowners in Port Gibson, Mississippi, were
boycotted after they failed to meet demands by civil rights groups
that they end certain racially discriminatory policies.3 2 The Supreme
Court of Mississippi found that the boycott was conducted and
maintained by violent means and that many who wished to trade
with the boycotted parties refrained for fear of retribution. 3 The
court concluded that where force, threats, or violence accompany a
boycott, the boycotters may be made to answer for their actions in
damages. 34 The boycotters' claims of constitutional protection were
found inapplicable where economic restraints were enforced through
intimidation.35
These decisions are significant because their analysis focuses on
the right of the target to be free of wrongful economic restraints
rather than on the boycott's eventual market impact. 36 If constitutional questions are to be resolved in accordance with current first
amendment theory,37 the individual target's concern must be
weighed in any equation that seeks to determine the strength of the
boycotters' claims to constitutional protection.3 8
29. Id. at 624.
30. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 393 So.2d 1290 (Miss. 1980), cert.
granted, 102 S. Ct. 565 (1981). But see Machesky v. Bizzell, 414 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1969);

see also Milk Wagon Drivers Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287, 294
(1941) (picketing enjoined where industrial dispute marked by violence).
31. 393 So. 2d 1290 (Miss. 1980), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 565 (1981).
32. Id. at 1295-97. Most of the demands centered on policies the defendants wished the

municipal government to enact. See id. at 1295-96.
33.
34.

Id. at 1297-1300.
Id. at 1301.

35. Id. The court noted: "We know of no instance, and our attention has been drawn to
no decision, wherein it has been adjudicated that free speech guaranteed by the First Amend-

ment includes in its protection the right to commit crime." Id.
36. See supra notes 16, 19.
37. See infra notes 123-76 and accompanying text.
38. See infra notes 135-73 and accompanying text. Any incidental restrictions on the
boycotters' right to free speech may be justified if the individual target can show a substantial

government interest in providing it protection. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377
(1968); see also supra note 19.
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Antitrust actions against boycotters have usually been brought
under section one of the Sherman Act 9 and under state antitrust
laws.40 Until recently, such actions have been rare. 41 Three cases decided under the Sherman Act in 1980,42 however, have squarely
raised the question of the constitutional rights of noncommercial
boycotters. In order to understand the context within which these
cases were analyzed it is important to examine the federal courts'
traditional approaches to boycotts challenged under the Sherman
Act.
Although the language of the Sherman Act prohibits "[e]very
contract, combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or

commerce among the several States, 43 the Supreme Court has held
that the Act applies only to those combinations that are found to
result in unreasonable restraints of trade.44 Commercial group boy39. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976): "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations, is declared to be illegal."
The Supreme Court has not yet ruled on whether the Sherman Act can be applied to
noncommercial boycotts, and lower federal courts have reached widely differing results. Compare Missouri v. NOW, 620 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir.) (noncommercial boycotts beyond intended
scope of Sherman Act), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 842 (1980) with Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp.
v. Waldman, 486 F. Supp. 759 (M.D. Pa.) (unconstitutional to enjoin noncommercial boycott
under Sherman Act), rev'd on other grounds, 634 F.2d 127 (3d Cir. 1980) and Osborn v.
Pennsylvania-Delaware Serv. Station Dealers Ass'n, 499 F. Supp. 553, 555-56 (D. Del. 1980)
(noncommercial boycotts may be constitutionally enjoined).
For purpose of analysis, this note will assume that all boycotts fall within the ambit of
federal antitrust laws and will examine the constitutional rights of boycotters in the context of
such laws. See generally Bird, Sherman Act Limitations on Noncommercial Concerted Refusals to Deal, 1970 DUKE L.J. 247 (1970); Coons, supra note 14; Note, Political Boycott, supra
note 5.
40. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 393 So. 2d 1290, 1301 (Miss. 1980), cert.
granted, 102 S.Ct. 565 (1981); New York v. Horsemen's Benevolent & Protective Ass'n, 55
A,D.2d 251, 389 N.Y.S.2d 868 (1976).
41. A successful action against public interest group boycotters was brought under the
Sherman Act in 1920. Council of Defense v. International Magazine Co., 267 F. 390 (8th Cir.
1920). It appears that the Sherman Act was not again invoked against such boycotters until
Missouri v. NOW, 620 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 842 (1980). At least one
state has sought to enforce its antitrust laws in similar circumstances. New York v. Horsemen's Benevolent & Protective Ass'n, 55 A.D.2d 251, 389 N.Y.S.2d 868 (1976) (seeking to
enforce New York's Donnelly Act, N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 340 (McKinney 1968)).
42. Missouri v. NOW, 620 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 842
(1980); Osborn v. Pennsylvania-Delaware Serv. Station Dealers Ass'n, 499 F. Supp. 553 (D.
Del. 1980); Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp. v. Waldman, 486 F. Supp. 759 (M.D. Pa.), rev'd on
other grounds, 634 F.2d 127 (3d Cir. 1980).
43. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
44. See Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238-39 (1918).
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cotts have been identified by the Court as one of a class of violations
that are presumed to be unreasonable or "illegal per se".45 The commercial group boycott has been placed in this category because of its
general goal-to prevent competition by attempting to deprive potential competitors of needed goods or services. The boycotters may
accomplish this goal through a variety of means. For example, a
group of wholesalers may seek to exclude a merchant from the
wholesale level by threatening to withhold their patronage from any
manufacturer who deals with the targeted wholesaler. 46 Or, where it
is necessary for members of the boycotting group to deal with each
other (such as in the brokerage profession), the boycotters may effectively quell competition by refusing to deal with merchants who
are not members of the group."7 Because of their "pernicious effect
on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue, ' 48 such practices
are "presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused or the business
49
excuse for their use."
Noncommercial group boycotts, while differing in form and purpose from commercial boycotts, can be said to have some anticompetitive effects. 50 Because of their limited scope, duration, and nonanticompetitive goals, however, noncommercial boycotts do not seem to
satisfy the per se doctrine's requirement of a "pernicious effect on
competition."51 Several commentators, arguing that noncommercial
boycotts may be constitutionally enjoined, have nevertheless agreed
that the per se doctrine is inapplicable to such boycotts.5 2 They propose that noncommercial boycotts be examined under a rule-of-reason analysis, under which courts do not presume the trade restraint
to be unreasonable, but rather analyze its nature to determine
45. See Federal Maritime Comm'n v. Aktiebolaget Svenska Amerika Linien (Swedish
American Line), 390 U.S. 238, 250 (1968); Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341,
347-49 (1963); see also, L.

SULLIVAN,

HANDBOOK

OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST

§§ 83-85

(1977).
46.

See L.

SULLIVAN,

supra note 45, § 83, at 230.

47. Id.
48.

Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).

49. Id.
50. In a boycott undertaken against a commercial enterprise by consumers, for instance,
the targeted enterprise is being deprived of a needed market. The resultant loss in revenue

renders the target less able to compete effectively with those in the same trade.
51.

Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).

52. See Note, Political,Social, and Economic Boycotts by Consumers: Do They Violate
the Sherman Act?, 17 Hous. L. REV. 775, 826-29 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Note, Political,
Social and Economic Boycotts]; Note, Protest Boycotts, supra note 11, at 1144-54.
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whether it is the kind of trade restraint that will be "significantly

anticompetitive in purpose or effect."5
Before a court can decide which method of economic analysis it
should apply in examining a noncommercial boycott, it must first
determine whether such boycotts may be constitutionally pro-

scribed. 54 Judicial treatment of a constitutional challenge to an antitrust action against noncommercial boycotters first occurred in
Council of Defense v. InternationalMagazine Co. 55 In that case, de-

fendants had promoted a boycott of a publishing company because
of the alleged pro-German sentiments of stockholder William Randolph Hearst.56 Plaintiffs brought an action under the Sherman Act,
and the defendants asserted that their activities in urging the boycott

were shielded by the right to free speech.5 7 Unfortunately, the court
did not engage in a full constitutional analysis of the issue, but
rather dismissed defendants' claim on the theory that verbal communications used to achieve an unlawful result-in this case a restraint
of trade-could not be constitutionally privileged." Significantly, the
53. Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1183 (D.C. Cir. 1978). At least one
court appears to have followed this approach in a noncommercial boycott case. See Allied
Int'l, Inc. v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 640 F.2d 1368, 1380-81 (1st Cir.) (no Sherman Act violation where longshoremens' refusal to unload Soviet cargo did not produce significant anticompetitive effects), affd, 50 U.S.L.W. 4402 (U.S. Apr. 20, 1982) (No. 80-1663)
(per curiam). For other applications of the rule of reason where traditional group boycotts are
not involved, see Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Worthen Bank
& Trust Co. v. National BankAmericard Inc., 485 F.2d 119, 130 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
415 U.S. 918 (1974).
54. This question arises because noncommercial boycotts are often used as a means of
political and social expression, thus implicating first amendment rights. See Note, NOW or
Never, supra note 5, at 1330-39; Note, Political, Social, and Economic Boycotts, supra note
52, at 792-804; Note, Protest Boycotts, supra note 11, at 1144-48.
55. 267 F. 390, 412 (8th Cir. 1920).
56. Id. at 410.
57. Id. at 408.
58. Id. at 412: "Any contention that appellants were within their constitutional rights of
free speech in saying, writing and publishing the objectionable matter, is answered by
Gompers v. Buck Stove [& Range] Co." Gompers, 221 U.S. 418 (1911), involved a boycott
called by the American Federation of Labor against Buck Stove & Range Co. after a dispute
over work hours. The Supreme Court of the District of Columbia issued an injunction against
the boycott leaders to prevent them from "declaring or threatening any boycott against the
complainant." Id. at 421 n.l. In an opinion by Mr. Justice Lamar the Supreme Court affirmed
that injunction:
The court's protective and restraining powers extend to every device whereby property is irreparably damaged or commerce is illegally restrained. To hold that the
restraint of trade under the Sherman anti-trust . . . could be enjoined, but that the
means through which the restraint was accomplished could not be enjoined would be
to render the law impotent.
Id. at 438-39 (emphasis added).
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court emphasized the publishing company's tangential relationship to
the dispute rather than the anticompetitive effect the boycott might
have on the market. 59 The court found it particularly important that

the allegedly unpatriotic statements attributed to Hearst had appeared in his newspapers, and not in the periodicals published by the
plaintiff:
[W]hatever may have been the derelictions of Hearst as an individual or in his newspapers, it is absolutely clear that complainant,
which was engaged solely in publishing and selling magazines, had
published no objectionable matter in its magazines, and it had
nothing to do with the Hearst newspapers, nor any interest in
them.60
The Council of Defense decision stood for nearly sixty years as

the only action brought under the Sherman Act against public interest group boycotters. In the next significant case, Missouri v.

NOW, ' the State of Missouri brought suit as " 'parens patriae,
trustee, guardian and representative of its citizens and the economy
of the State'

"62

against a women's group that had spearheaded a

convention boycott 3 against Missouri as one of the states that had
failed to ratify the proposed Equal Rights Amendment." Missouri
sought injunctive relief against NOW,'6 5 alleging that NOW's activities constituted a combination and conspiracy in restraint of trade in
It should be noted that Gompers arose in the context of a labor dispute and not from a
special interest group boycott. In 1941 the Supreme Court construed the Clayton Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1976), and the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 52, 101-115 (1976), as
providing a statutory labor-dispute exemption from the Sherman Act "[s]o long as a union
acts in its self-interest and does not combine with non-labor groups." United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 232 (1941) (footnote omitted).
59. 267 F. at 411.

60. Id.
61. 467 F. Supp. 289 (W.D. Mo. 1979), aff'd, 620 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 842 (1980).
62. Id. at 296.
63. Id. at 291. For the stipulation concerning the nature of NOW's activities, see infra
note 66.
64. The proposed twenty-seventh amendment to the United States Constitution reads as
follows:
Section 1. Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the
United States or by any state on account of sex.
Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation,
the provisions of this article.
Section 3. This amendment shall take effect two years after the date of ratification.
H.R.J. Res. 208, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 86 Stat. 1523 (1972).
65. 467 F. Supp. at 291. Sherman Act violations may be enjoined under § 16 of the
Clayton Act. 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1976).
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violation of section one of the Sherman Act."
Relying heavily on the legislative history of the Sherman Act, 7
the Eighth Circuit rejected Missouri's contention that a boycott used
to further a political goal could fall within the strictures of the Act.68
"It was the competitors in commerce that [the Sherman Act's
draftsman] had in mind as the concern of his [Act]," the court concluded, "not noncompetitors motivated socially or politically. ' 69 Central to the court's holding that the Act could not be extended to
public interest group boycotts was its recognition that the boycotters
were exercising a constitutionally protected right to petition,7 0 a
right that was involved because the purpose of the boycott was primarily to encourage the passage of certain proposed legislation. 1 Although NOW's tactics fell technically within the proscriptive language of the Sherman Act, their use of such iactics to communicate
their feelings to the state government was seen as a purpose that
brought them beyond its scope.72
The NOW decision was based partly on the Supreme Court's
decision in Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor
Freight, Inc.7 s In Noerr, a railroad industry association hired a public relations firm to disseminate unfavorable information about the
rival trucking industry.7 Its goal was to arouse public resentment for
truckers and to create a demand for legislation that would hamper
66.

15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). The nature of NOW's activities was characterized in a stipu-

lation made in the district court: "NOW has sought to persuade and urge those organizations
that support making equal rights for women a part of the Constitution to refrain from holding
conferences, conventions and meetings in unratified states." 467 F. Supp. at 291.
Missouri also framed causes of action under its antitrust statute, Mo. ANN. STAT. §
416.031(1) (Vernon 1979), and under the tort of "tortious intentional infliction of economic
harm without legal justification or excuse." 467 F. Supp. at 291.
67. See 21 CONG. REc. 2658-59 (1890). See generally I E. KINTER, THE LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS AND RELATED STATUTES (1978).
68.

620 F.2d 1301, 1304-09 (8th Cir. 1980).

69. Id. at 1309.
70. Id. at 1310.
71. Id. at 1312.
72.

Id. at 1315-16. The question of whether the boycott action violated Missouri's anti-

trust statute, Mo. ANN. STAT. § 416.031(1) (Vernon 1979), was disposed of in an identical
manner. 620 F.2d at 1316. Missouri's tort claim for intentional infliction of harm without legal
excuse was rejected because of "[the] overriding First Amendment . . .right to petition." Id.
at 1319. It must be observed that the failure to recognize an action in tort because of constitutional considerations does not necessarily mean that the court is asserting that a contrary re-

sult would be unconstitutional.
73.

365 U.S. 127 (1961).

74.

Id. at 129.
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truckers' operations.7 5 Plaintiffs charged that the association's campaign constituted a conspiracy to restrain trade in violation of the
Sherman Act. 6 In dismissing the action, the Court held that the
publicity campaign had been aimed primarily at influencing governmental policy and was thus a valid exercise of the right to petition.77
Mr. Justice Black, writing for the majority stated:
To hold that the government retains the power to act in [its] representative capacity and yet hold, at the same time, that the people
cannot freely inform the government of their wishes would impute
to the Sherman Act a purpose to regulate, not business activity, but
political activity, a purpose which would have no basis whatever in
the legislative history of the Act. Secondly, and of at least equal

significance, such a construction of the Sherman Act would raise
important constitutional questions. The right of petition is one of
the freedoms protected by the Bill of Rights, and we cannot, of
impute to Congress an intent to invade these
course, lightly
78
freedoms.

Noerr's relevance to the issue presented in NOW 9 is questionable, since the alleged restraint of trade complained of in Noerr involved a publicity campaign, not a boycott. Also, the Court did not
say that application of the Sherman Act to Noerr situations would
be unconstitutional, but merely that such a construction "would raise
important constitutional questions." 80 Although the NOW court's
recognition of a first amendment right to boycott 81 would be relevant
to the ultimate constitutional question in some circumstances, the
court declined to decide that question, which would have required it
to balance the first amendment right against the right of the plaintiffs to be free from undue economic interference. This failure to address a pivotal issue was noted by Judge Gibson in his dissent:8
[The] factual distinctions between Noerr and the case at bar mandate that the court in this case undertake a more comprehensive
balancingof the important governmental interest in preserving the
free enterprise system with the interest of people to use this particular method of influencing legislation. . . .This brings us back to
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 135-38.
Id. at 137-38 (footnotes omitted).
See supra notes 61-66 and accompanying text.
365 U.S. at 138.
620 F.2d at 1310.
Id. at 1319-26 (Gibson, J., dissenting).
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the crucial question of whether, upon balancing the first amendment interests of NOW with the substantial and important governmental interests embodied in the antitrust laws, the politically motivated boycott falls within the ambit of the antitrust laws or is
constitutionally protected by the first amendment.8"
The NOW majority's perfunctory evaluation of the plaintiff's
claim that NOW's activities constituted a "secondary boycott"8 also
merits serious attention. By advancing this claim, Missouri attempted to show that the merchants who suffered the effects of
NOW's economic action were involved only tangentially in the dispute and thus merited greater protection from the court than would
a more directly interested party. 5 Although the court acknowledged
that such boycotts "[have] been called unethical," 6 it held that the
boycotters' tactics were shielded because they were "political activity
aimed at persuading the legislature to take action. ' 7
A similar result was reached by a Pennsylvania district court in
Crown Central Petroleum Corp. v. Waldman,8" where an association
of service station dealers executed a group boycott of sales to the
public in order to protest gasoline price limits set by the Department
of Energy.89 The defendant, one of the dealers, had closed his station
for seven consecutive Sundays and for one entire three-day period.90
His supplier, Crown Central Petroleum Corporation, alleged that
such closings violated the Sherman Act and sought an injunction
prohibiting the defendant "from further participation in any conspiracy in restraint of trade in interstate commerce for gasoline or from
doing any act in furtherance thereof."91 Using reasoning similar to
that employed in NOW,9 2 the Crown Centralcourt held that the service station dealers' actions fell3 within the exemption enunciated by
9
the Supreme Court in Noerr
Crown Central went beyond the NOW decision, however, by undertaking to balance the governmental interest in economic regula83.
84.
85.
86.

Id. at 1324 (Gibson, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 1312.
Id. at 1312, 1313 n.12.
Id.

87. Id. (footnote omitted).
88. 486 F. Supp. 759 (M.D. Pa.), rev'd on other grounds, 634 F.2d 127 (3d Cir. 1980).

89. Id. at 762.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id. at 761.
Id. at 762 (citation omitted).
See supra notes 67-72 and accompanying text.
486 F. Supp. at 763-66.
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tion against the boycotters' free speech interests.9" The first hurdle
the court cleared was the question of whether boycotts can be con-

sidered "speech." '95 In deciding that noncommercial boycotts do constitute protected expression, 6 the court derived guidelines from the
Supreme Court's decision in Spence v. Washington,9 7 under which,
according to Crown Central, conduct is protected expression (1) if
the conduct is a clear departure from the actor's normal conduct and
cannot be explained in any way other than that the actor is expres-

sing himself; (2) if the actor has a legitimate reason to expect his
audience to view his conduct as communicative; and (3) if the actor
intends to and does communicate.9 Using this analysis, the Crown
Central court found that the dealers' boycott met all three criteria. 99
Having thus determined that boycotts can be viewed as expression,
the court then weighed the first amendment rights adhering to
boycotters against the government's interest in proscribing anticompetitive actions.' 00 The court reasoned that the boycott "might reasonably be.

.

.the only means of effective expression" for the deal-

ers, and concluded that the dealers' interest in free expression
outweighed economic concerns.'
94. Id. at 769.
95. Id. at 766.
96. See id. at 768-69.
97. 418 U.S. 405 (1974) (per curiam). Spence involved a conviction under a Washington statute forbidding improper use of an American flag. Id. at 406-07. Spence had affixed to
the flag a large peace symbol (a circle enclosing a trident) made of removable black tape. Id.
at 406. Spence claimed that the purpose of this display was to protest American involvement
in Cambodia and the killings at Kent State and to communicate that "I thought America
stood for peace." Id. at 408-09. The Supreme Court overturned Spence's conviction, finding
his conduct sufficiently communicative to warrant first amendment protection, and also finding
that the state had not shown a substantial interest in proscribing such conduct. Id. at 409-15.
98. 486 F. Supp. at 767; see Spence, 418 U.S. at 410-15.
99. 486 F. Supp. at 768:
The closings occurred simultaneously for three consecutive days. This is not the
normal conduct of a service station, whether or not gas is in short supply. The independent dealers had announced to both the public and the Department of Energy
well in advance of the closings that such action might be taken. In the context of the
rising cost of gasoline in the summer of 1979, the dealers might reasonably believe
that the public and the government (their audience) would view the closings as expressive of the dealers urgent needs and desires concerning the enforcement and
enactment of energy-related regulations. Finally, the dealers intended that the closings communicate their frustration and we can reasonably believe that they did so
communicate.
100. Id. at 768-69.
101. Id. at 769. In measuring the strength of the governmental interest against that of
the boycotters, the court applied the test used in United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367
(1968). In that case, Chief Justice Warren wrote:
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The balance reached in Crown Central was clearly rejected in
Osborn v. Pennsylvania-DelawareService Station Dealers Association.102 The plaintiff was a consumer who alleged a violation of the
Sherman Act on the part of Delaware service station dealers who
were participating in a boycott similar to that involved in Crown
Central.' 3 Asserting that "a boycott, along with its communicative
component, has a coercive economic effect," the court held that boycotts "may be regulated without serious jeopardy to First Amendment interests. 10 4 Whether a particular boycott should be enjoined,
the court stated, should be decided by looking to traditional methods
of antitrust analysis .1 5 "[I]f a boycott designed to influence governmental action has produced an anti-competitive effect of the kind
[the Sherman and Clayton Acts] were intended to guard against,"
the court continued, "it seems . . . that relief can ordinarily be

granted with little threat to First Amendment values."106 Osborn
noted the differences between classic anticompetitive boycotts 0 7 and
special interest group boycotts, asserting that such distinctions militated against the application of per se liability for the latter. 0 8 Thus,
the court appears to have endorsed a rule of reason approach,10 9
under which boycotts will be enjoined unless the defendants can
overcome what the court viewed as a highly substantial regulatory
interest. 10
Whatever imprecision inheres in these terms, we think it is clear that a government
regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedom is no greater than is
essential to the furtherance of that interest.
391 U.S. at 377.
102. 499 F. Supp. 553 (D. Del. 1980).
103. Id. at 555; see supra text accompanying note 90.
104. 499 F. Supp. at 557.
105. Id. at 558.
106. Id.
107. For a discussion of classic anticompetitive boycotts, see supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
108. 499 F. Supp. at 558. For a discussion of boycotts and the per se doctrine, see supra
notes 45-53 and accompanying text.
109. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
110. Although the court implied that it would almost invariably enjoin boycotts as unreasonable restraints of trade, it did admit that such an approach may not be warranted where
the application of the antitrust laws "would substantially impair the participants' ability to be
heard." 499 F. Supp. at 558. This view is similar to that espoused by Justice Harlan in United
States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 388-89 (Harlan, J., concurring) (stating that even where
substantial government interest is present symbolic conduct should not be restricted if such
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Perhaps the most salient feature of the NOW, Crown Central,
and Osborn decisions was their recognition that boycotts must be
viewed as expressive conduct implying certain first amendment
rights."11 The various tests these courts employed in deciding
whether noncommercial boycotts can be enjoined, however, show
how widely their views differ-both on the applicable law and on the
strength of the competing interests involved. Whereas the Crown
Central court asserted that the free speech rights of boycotters outweighed the interest in economic regulation,11 2 the Osborn court, addressing a similar set of facts, found that the strong governmental
concern for maintaining competitive markets could seldom be counterbalanced. 113 Although in each of these cases the parties boycotted
were only tangentially related to the dispute, the courts largely disregarded this factor.1 14 Ordinarily, a court would carefully consider
this important distinction; in these cases, however, it is clear why the
primary/secondary distinction did not receive greater attention. In
the NOW case, the court's insistence that it was merely deciding a
question of statutory interpretation""' precluded any serious consideration of the tactics used by the boycotters; any boycott whose purpose was political in nature was, in the court's view, not covered by
the Sherman Act."1 6 Similarly, the Osborn court's willingness to subject virtually all boycotts to Sherman Act scrutiny 17 rendered unnecessary any distinction by that court between primary and secondary action. Finally, in Crown Central, the plaintiff corporation
restriction would prevent the actor from reaching significant audience).

111.

See NOW, 620 F.2d at 1310; Osborn, 499 F. Supp. at 556-57; Crown Cent., 486

F.Supp. at 767-69.

112. See 486 F. Supp. at 769.
113. See 499 F. Supp. at 557-58.
114. The only mention of the secondary nature of the boycott in question occurred in
NOW, 620 F.2d at 1312, where its significance was dismissed by the court without extensive
analysis. Judge Gibson, dissenting in NOW, did state that a finding of secondary aspects in a

particular boycott would be important to a decision, noting that the distinction between primary and secondary boycotts "has been important in drawing the line between protected and

unprotected activity in other noncommercial contexts, and might be relevant to the balance to
be drawn in this situation." Id. at 1325 n.19 (Gibson, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
115. See id.at 1304-16.
116.

The court stated:

NOW appears to have utilized its political power to bring about the ratification of
the ERA. The tool it chose was a boycott, a device economic by nature. However,
using a boycott in a non-competitive political arena for the purpose of influencing

legislation is not proscribed by the Sherman Act.
Id. at 1315.

117. 499 F. Supp. at 557-58.
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could not forcefully argue the secondary claim, since the action was
aimed at cutting off supplies to consumers, and plaintiff was not a
118
consumer.
It is axiomatic that any attempt to balance conflicting interests
cannot arrive at a just determination if it fails to take into account
all significant factors weighing in favor of one party or the other.
Classic antitrust analysis focuses almost solely on market effects"'
because until recently no cases have arisen that present serious constitutional difficulties.120 Where such considerations exist, courts
must look to current first amendment theory, which requires that a
balance be reached between constitutional values and valid governmental interests. 121 That the government has a strong interest in preserving a competitive market is clear. It has also long been recognized at common law that this interest may be augmented by a
strong governmental concern for protecting individual targets from
unfair or unjustified economic restraint.1 22 The next section of this
note examines the nature of the free speech rights asserted by
boycotters, and the interplay between those rights and the dual governmental interest in maintaing a competitive market and protecting
targets from undue economic interference. An analytical framework
is then proposed whereby the common law sensitivity to the interests
of individual targets is shown to be consonant with existing standards of analysis under the antitrust laws as well as with current
constitutional doctrines concerning free speech.
118.

486 F. Supp. at 761.

119. See, e.g., United States v. Arnold Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 374 (1967)
(reasonableness of trade restraint determined by gauging market impact); Northern Pac. Ry.
v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6 (1958) (analyzing adverse market effects of tying agreements);
Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1183-89 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (football league's player
draft unreasonable restraint on market for player's services).
120. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
121. See, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 51 (1971); United States v. O'Brien, 391
U.S. 367, 376 (1968); East Hartford Educ. Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 562 F.2d 838 (2d Cir.
1977); Non-Resident Taxpayers Ass'n v. Municipality of Philadelphia, 341 F. Supp. 1139,
1146 (D. N.J. 1971), afl'd, 478 F.2d 456 (3d Cir.), afJ'd, 406 U.S. 951 (1972); United States
v. Farinas, 308 F. Supp. 459, 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd, 448 F.2d 1334 (2d Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 934 (1972). See generally Frantz, The First Amendment in the Balance, 71
YALE L. J. 1424 (1962); Note, Of Interests Fundamental and Compelling: The Emerging
ConstitutionalBalance, 57 B.U. L. REv. 462 (1977); Note, Symbolic Conduct, 68 COLUM. L.
REV, 1091, 1121-25 (1968).
122. See supra notes 16-38 and accompanying text.
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NONCOMMERCIAL BOYCOTTERS
BOYCOTTS AS SPEECH

Many forms of conduct contain an expressive element. 12 3 It is
not unusual, therefore, for a law that ostensibly regulates only antisocial behavior to be challenged as an undue restriction of speech.12 4
In United States v. O'Brien,125 the Supreme Court held that govern-

mental regulation of expressive conduct
is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the
Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged
First Amendment freedoms 1is26 no greater than is essential to the
furtherance of that interest."

State regulation of boycotts clearly satisfies the first and third
prongs of the O'Brien test-valid governmental power and no purpose to suppress free expression-but must bear careful scrutiny

under the second and fourth requirements. 27 Thus, it must be discerned whether the governmental interest in proscribing noncommercial boycotts is substantial enough to justify restriction of first
amendment rights. 28
The Right to Boycott.-In analyzing the nature of first amend-

ment rights accruing to public interest group boycotters it is necessary to identify both the utility of economic actions for such groups
and the effect on the boycotters' power to communicate of suppres123. See generally Nimmer, The Meaning of Symbolic Speech Under the First Amendment, 21 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 29, 30-38 (1973).
124. Such claims have often met with success. See, e.g., Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S.
405 (1974) (affixing peace symbol to United States flag); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (wearing black armbands as protest to war. But see
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (no constitutional right to burn draft card);
United States v. Calderon, 655 F.2d 1037 (10th Cir. 1981) (freedom of speech does not include right to express displeasure at speaker by throwing eggs); New Rider v. Board of Educ.,
480 F.2d 693 (10th Cir.) (not unconstitutional for school to forbid American Indian students
to wear hair in traditional manner), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1097 (1973).
125. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
126. Id. at 377.
127. Accord Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp. v. Waldman, 486 F. Supp. 759, 768 (M.D.
Pa.), rev'd on other grounds, 634 F.2d 127 (3d Cir. 1980).
128. Justice Black described the test this way:
Where a statute does not directly abridge free speech, but-while regulating a subject within the State's power-tends to have the incidental effect of inhibiting First
Amendment rights, it is well settled that the statute can be upheld if the effect on
speech is minor in relation to the need for control of the conduct and the lack of
alternative means for doing so.
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 51 (1970).
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sion of the boycott right. It must be recognized at the outset that
some enterprises, by their nature, do not make changes in policy unless prompted by economic concern. The most obvious example of
such an enterprise is the large corporation. In an age where corporations and other business concerns make decisions that impact heavily
on the lives of the average citizen, it is important that the people
these decisions affect are able to communicate their displeasure.
Since such targets are not accessible via the ballot box, the only way
citizens' groups may be able to influence their actions may be by
withdrawing their patronage. 12 9
Furthermore, boycotts are useful in gaining exposure for matters of public concern. Since boycotts are often used by small, relatively weak groups who cannot afford to expend the vast sums necessary to mount an extensive publicity campaign, many important
issues would never gain public attention if noncommercial boycotts
were to be enjoined. Finally, to say that a group cannot peacefully
band together to refuse to deal is clearly antithetical to the common
sense notion that no person should be forced to subsidize an antipathetic practice. It has long been acknowledged that no action may lie
against an individual who refuses to deal, even where that individual's motive is malicious. 130 It would be unjust, therefore, to impose
liability merely because a group of like-minded individuals have
banded together to accomplish a legitimate purpose-to protest effectively a practice they believe harmful to themselves or their
community.
The Interest in Economic Regulation.--One governmental interest in proscribing boycotts may be the maintenance of a free and
competitive market.' 3' Boycotts run counter to this objective because
they result in a restriction of trade that hinders the target's ability to
compete effectively with others engaged in a similar trade. 3 2 Although it is evident that if such a practice were allowed to pervade
the business community it would eventually result in monopoly or
oligopoly, it is less clear that noncommercial boycotters' limited and
sporadic attempts to assert their influence could produce such a re129. See Note, ExtrajudicialConsumer Pressure: An Effective Impediment to Unethical Business Practices, 1969 DUKE L.J. 1011, 1015.
130. See United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 306-07 (1919); Great Atlantic
& Pacific Tea Co. v. Cream of Wheat Co., 227 F. 46, 48-49 (2d Cir. 1915); Baran v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 256 F. 571, 572-73 (S.D.N.Y. 1919).
131. United States v. Topco, 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972); Paramount Famous Lasky
Corp. v. United States, 282 U.S. 30, 42-43 (1930).
132. See L. SULLIVAN, supra note 45, § 83, at 230.
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suit. The laws concerning business regulation are also predicated on
the principle that businessmen have a right to conduct their business
free of interference from competitors who wish to use their economic
leverage to eliminate the target from the marketplace. 3 It is questionable, however, whether a similar interest exists in protecting parties from disputes with noncompetitors. Noncommercial boycotts are
usually spurred not by a group that fears the target as a competitor,
but by a group that wishes to express its displeasure with a practice
that may adversely affect them or their community. Thus, the economic interests in noncommercial boycott cases appear relatively
weak in light both of the nonpervasiveness of the public interest
group boycott and of the origin of public dispute in the operation of
the target's business. Balanced against the substantial speech interests involved in noncommercial boycotts, 3 4 the economic concerns do
not seem overriding. This balance is predicated, however, on a situation where the target is directly involved in the dispute and where
the boycott is conducted by lawful means to achieve a lawful purpose. Where such conditions do not exist, the balance of interests
may shift.
UNJUSTIFIABLE

BoYcoTTS

Boycotts may be considered unjustifiable when the tactics the
boycotters have employed in advancing their cause go beyond the
mere refusal to deal with an adversary. In such cases, the governmental interest in protecting the target increases. At the same time,
the boycotters' claims that they are engaging in a protected activity
are diminished in strength because of the greater harm resulting
from such practices. Some examples of boycotts which may fit into
this mold are examined below. These include: boycotts aimed at parties only tangentially involved in a dispute (secondary boycotts);13 5
boycotts conducted by means of intimidation, threats or violence; 13 6
137
and boycotts aimed at persuading the target to violate the law.
Unlawful Purpose Boycotts.-Boycotts aimed at forcing the
target to violate the law may constitutionally be enjoined. That noncommercial boycotters can claim no constitutional right to engage in
133.

This concept is primarily embodied in the tort action for intentional interference

with prospective economic advantage. See supra notes 16-38 and accompanying text.
134. See supra text accompanying notes 123-29.

135.

See infra notes 159-72 and accompanying text.

136.

See infra notes 142-58 and accompanying text.

137. See infra notes 138-41 and accompanying text.
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such behavior is strongly suggested by Giboney v. Empire Storage &
Ice Co.,138 a Supreme Court case dealing with a labor dispute. In
Giboney, the Court upheld an injunction prohibiting a union from
peacefully picketing a wholesaler, because the union's goal was to
force the wholesaler to cease dealing with nonunion peddlers. 39
Such a practice, if adopted by the target, would have violated Missouri's antitrust laws.140 The Court rejected the contention that economic coercion with the goal of inducing unlawful conduct could be
protected by the right to free speech:
It is true that the agreements and course of conduct here were as in
most instances brought about through speaking or writing. But it
has never been deemed an abridgement of freedom of speech or
press to make a course of conduct illegal merely because the conduct was in part initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of
language, either spoken, written, or printed. . . . And it is clear
that appellants were doing more than exercising a right of free
speech or press. They were exercising their economic power together with that of their allies to compel Empire to abide by union
rather than by state regulation of trade. 141
Thus, it is clear that if this situation arose in the context of a noncommercial boycott, the target would have an extremely strong
claim for governmental protection; no group can ever claim the right
to force a target to violate the law.
Boycotts Conducted By Illegal Acts. 142 ---The most important
case concerning a boycott conducted by illegal acts is probably
NAACP v. ClaiborneHardware Co.,1 43 which is presently scheduled
for review by the Supreme Court. In Claiborne Hardware, a civil
rights group conducted a boycott against white merchants in Port
Gibson, Mississippi after certain of that group's demands were not
met.144 The Supreme Court of Mississippi held that since violence
permeated the boycott1 45 the boycott leaders could be held answera138. 336 U.S. 490 (1949).
139. Id. at 493-94.
140. Id. at 502-03.
141. Id. (citations omitted) (footnotes omitted).
142. A boycott may be considered to have been conducted by illegal acts when the
boycotters have sought to further their boycott effort by employing any course of conduct that
is prohibited by law.
143. 393 So. 2d 1290 (1980), cert. granted, 102 S.Ct. 565 (1981).
144. Id. at 1297.
145. The court recounted a number of violent incidents perpetrated by proponents of the
boycott and directed against individuals violating the boycott, including beatings, death
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ble in damages.14e The pivotal question presented by such a case is
whether the target can claim protection against the illegal acts
alone, or against the entire boycott effort, if the boycott was conducted primarily by illegal acts. It seems that if a group has the
right to boycott peacefully, then those aspects of a boycott that are
peaceful and otherwise justified should not be enjoined just because
of isolated acts of violence. Courts should not hesitate, however, to
enjoin conduct that might threaten, harass, or intimidate prospective
patrons. It follows that any business losses directly attributable to
such illegal tactics should be assessed against those responsible.
An applicable analogy147 is again presented in a case which in-

volved a labor dispute. In Milk Wagon Drivers Union Local 753 v.
Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc.,148 a union dispute was accompanied by
more than 50 serious acts of violence, including bombings, window
smashings, beatings of nonunion drivers, and arson.1 49 A preliminary
injunction restraining all union conduct, violent and peaceful, was
sustained by the Illinois Supreme Court,1 50 and the United States
Supreme Court affirmed.1 51 Justice Frankfurter wrote:
It must never be forgotten . . .that the Bill of Rights was the

child of the Enlightenment. Back of the guarantee of free speech
lay faith in the power of an appeal to reason by all peaceful means
for gaining access to the mind. It was in order to avert force and
explosions due to restrictions on rational modes of communication
that the guarantee of free speech was given a generous scope. But

utterance in a context of violence can lose its significance as an
appeal to reason and become part of an instrument of force. 1Such
utterance was not meant to be sheltered by the Constitution. 52
The Court said, however, that free speech "cannot be denied by
drawing from a trivial rough incident or a moment of animal exuberance the conclusion that otherwise peaceful conduct has the taint of
force."1 53 Because of the serious and pervasive acts of violence assothreats, and property destruction. Id. at 1297-1300.
146. Id. at 1307. Although the issuance of an injunction by a Mississippi chancery court
was also assigned as error, the defendants did not argue this point on appeal, and it was not
considered. Id. at 1293.
147. See generally R. GORMAN, BAsIC TEXT ON LABOR LAw 215-16 (1976).
148. 312 U.S. 287 (1941).
149. Id. at 291-92.
150. Id. at 291.
151. Id. at 299.
152. Id. at 293.
153. Id.
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ciated with this job action, the Court held that the "momentum of
fear generated by past violence would survive""" even though the
future picketing might be wholly peaceful. Thus, in order to protect
the target from such undue interference, the Court concluded that
1 55
an injunction could properly be issued.

In ClaiborneHardware,then, if the frequency and scope of violence were so extensive as to create an aura of intimidation that prevented potential customers from dealing with the target,1 56 then the

target had a very strong claim for governmental protection. Such a
claim would no doubt override the free speech claims, and the boycott could be enjoined. This result accords not only with the general
doctrine handed down in Meadowmoor Dairies,157 but also with the
requirements of the O'Brien test.15 8 The boycotters in such a situa-

tion cannot well argue that their free speech rights allow them to
reap the fruits of a boycott conducted by means so patently unfair.
And 'While the target cannot ask a court to force those who dislike it
to deal, it can seek protection for those persons who wish to continue
their patronage. This claim by the target for protection of its market
should create a sufficiently strong governmental interest to counterbalance the opposing first amendment claims.
The Secondary Boycott.-As mentioned previously, 159 a secondary boycott is any boycott aimed at a target not directly involved in
the dispute at hand. The distinction between primary and secondary
activity has long been important to the law of labor disputes,16 0 and
secondary activity has been declared illegal in such disputes through
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Id. at 294.
Id. at 298-99.
See supra notes 139-46.
See supra notes 148-55 and accompanying text.
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968); see supra text accompanying note

126.
159. See supra notes 25-28, 114 and accompanying text.
160. See generally R. GORMAN, supranote 147, at 240-43. At common law, a secondary
labor boycott often gave rise to an action in tort as a wrongful interference with the business of
an uninvolved party. See e.g., Old Dominion S.S. Co. v. McKenna, 30 F. 48, 49
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1887); Bricklayers', Masons' & Plasterers' Int'l Union v. Seymour Ruff &
Sons, Inc., 160 Md. 483, 154 A. 52 (1931); Picket v. Walsh, 192 Mass. 572, 78 N.E. 753, 760
(1906).
A secondary labor boycott is defined as "the application of economic pressure upon a
person with whom the union has no dispute regarding its own terms of employment in order to
induce that person to cease doing business with another employer with whom the union does
have such a dispute." R. GORMAN, supra note 147, at 240. The Taft-Hartley Act regards the
secondary labor boycott as an "unfair labor practice." 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1976).
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the provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act.1 61 Although the question of
the significance of the secondary aspect of noncommercial boycotts
has not yet been fully adjudicated, the Supreme Court has in other
situations recognized that the difference between primary and secondary action may have constitutional significance. For example, in
Carpenter's & Joiners Local 213 v. Ritter's Cafe,l" 2 a labor union

that had been enjoined from picketing a secondary target claimed
that the injunction violated, inter alia, its right to free speech. 163 The
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the injunction, 1" distinguishing between boycotts aimed at secondary targets and those
aimed at more direct adversaries:
[The State] has deemed it desirable to insulate from the dispute an
establishment which industrially has no connection with the dispute. [The State] has not attempted to protect other business enterprises [of] the petitioners' real adversary. . . . [T]he constitution does not forbid [the State] to draw the line which has been
drawn here.16 5
161. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (b)(4) (1976).
162. 315 U.S. 722 (1942).
163. Id. at 725-28. The petitioners relied on the Court's decision in Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940), which held that a statute prohibiting even peaceful labor picketing
was unconstitutional on its face and that such picketing was entitled to protection under the
first amendment if aimed at "the dissemination of information and opinion." Id. at 106.
164. 315 U.S. at 728.
165. Id. at 727-28. While this note was in press, the United States Supreme Court held
in International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Allied Int'l, Inc., 50 U.S.L.W. 4402 (U.S. Apr. 20,
1982) (No. 80-1663) (per curiam), aff'g 640 F.2d 1368 (Ist Cir. 1981), that a labor union,
which refused to handle Soviet cargo for purely political reasons, could constitutionally be held
liable for engaging in an unlawful secondary boycott. Id. at 4406. The boycott effort began
early in 1980 when International Longshoreman's Association (ILA) President Thomas
Gleason ordered all union members to stop handling goods bound for and arriving from the
Soviet Union as a means of protesting that nation's 1979 invasion of Afghanistan. Id. at 440203. Allied International, Inc. (Allied), an importer of Soviet wood products for distribution in
the United States, filed suit for damages against the union alleging, inter alia, that the ILA's
action constituted a secondary boycott. Id. at 4403. Secondary boycotts are proscribed under
section 8(b)(4) of the Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1976). See supra note 160.
Section 303 of the Labor-Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 187 (1976), provides a
private right of action for damages to those injured by secondary labor boycotts. The district
court dismissed plaintiff's claim, holding that the union was engaged in "a primary boycott of
Russian goods" and was thus outside the secondary boycott provision. Allied Int'l, Inc. v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 492 F.Supp. 334, 336 (D. Mass. 1980), rev'd, 640 F.2d
1368 (Ist Cir. 1981), affid, 50 U.S.L.W. 4402 (U.S. Apr. 20, 1982) (No. 80-1663) (per
curiam). The First Circuit reversed, holding that the ILA's refusal to handle Soviet goods fell
within the proscriptive language of section 8(b)(4), 640 F.2d at 1370-78, and that the boycotters "[b]y resorting to coercive tactics against neutral parties" had exceeded the bounds of
constitutionally protected expression. Id. at 1379.
In affirming the circuit court's decision, the Supreme Court also emphasized that the
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Thus, where a neutral party becomes an unwilling participant in
a dispute, that party's right to be free from interference should outweigh the boycotters' interest in free expression. Such a conclusion is
mandated by several factors. First, where the boycott targets a neuboycott, while geared ultimately toward influencing the Soviet Union, had a substantial adverse affect on Allied, a party neutral to the dispute. The Court stated:
The ILA has no dispute with Allied. . . . It does not seek any labor objective from
[Allied]. Its sole complaint is with the foreign and military policy of the Soviet
Union. As understandable and even commendable as the ILA's ultimate objectives
may be, the certain effect of its action is to impose a heavy burden on neutral employers, And it is just such a burden that the secondary boycott provisiens were
designed to prevent.
50 U.S.L.W. at 4405 (footnotes omitted).
The Court stressed that Congress, in enacting § 8(b)(4), had intended to provide relief to
"helpless victims of quarrels that do not concern them at all." Id. (citation omitted). The
Court explained that such relief extended to all secondary boycotts, regardless of scope or
character. (To this effect, the Court quoted Senator Taft's response to the suggestion during
hearings that there were good secondary boycotts and bad secondary boycotts: "'Our committee heard evidence for weeks and never succeeded in having anyone tell us any difference
between different [types] of secondary boycotts. So we have broadened the provision dealing
with secondary boycotts as to make them an unfair labor practice.'" 50 U.S.L.W. at 4405
n.23 (quoting 93 CONG. REC. 4323 (1947) (remarks of Sen. Taft.)).
Having thus construed the statute, the Court considered whether the application of §
8(b)(4) infringed the boycotters' first amendment rights. The Court described the ILA boycott
as one designed "not to communicate but to coerce" and indicated that such a boycott merits
little first amendment protection. Id. at 4406. Further, the Court dismissed as minimal any
inhibiting effect on the boycotters' ability to communicate. The Court stated: "There are many
ways in which a union and its individual members may express their opposition to Russian
foreign policy without infringing upon the rights of others." Id. Finally, the Court cited its
decision in O'Brien for the proposition that "'when 'speech' and 'nonspeech' elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms.'"
Id. at 4406 n.26 (quoting 391 U.S. at 376). The Court indicated that Congress, in prohibiting
all secondary boycotts had expressed a substantial interest in protecting all neutral employers.
Id. at 4405-06. The Court appeared to indicate that this substantial interest, contrasted with
the boycotters' relatively insignificant first amendment claims, met the standards evinced in
O'Brien. See id. at 4406.
While the Court has stated in no uncertain terms that politically oriented labor secondary
boycotts may be constitutionally proscribed, it remains to be seen how the Court will treat
nonlabor secondary and primary boycotts. Although Allied International suggests strongly
that the Court will look askance at any secondary boycott, there are some salient differences
between labor and nonlabor secondary boycotts. Nonlabor boycotters usually have no motive
other than advancing a political cause in initiating a boycott. But in labor union boycotts, it
may be possible that the union is pursuing mixed objectives. As the Court warned, "[t]he
difference between labor and political objectives would be difficult to draw in many cases." Id.
at 4405. Second, labor boycotters, in refusing to work for the secondary target, directly affect
his ability to buy from and sell to whom he pleases. This effect creates a greater restraint on
the target of a labor secondary boycott than on the target of a nonlabor secondary boycott,
who loses trade only to the extent that the boycotters themselves refuse to deal. While these
distinctions may play a role in future decisions, they seem of doubtful importance in light of
the Court's broad language favoring the protection of neutrals.
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tral party the governmental interest lies not only in protecting the
free market but also in protecting a target from unfair economic restraint.' 6 Second, if it is accepted that an indispensible component
in establishing a right to boycott is the boycotters' privilege not to
deal with a party they dislike, such a component is lacking where the
boycotters and the target have no direct dispute. Thus, the govern-

mental interest in protecting neutral parties and in containing the
dispute is substantial enough to justify enjoining any secondary aspects of a boycott without unconstitutionally infringing the boycotters' first amendment rights.
If a court is to enjoin boycotts based on the distinction between
primary and secondary activity, it is necessary to identify what characteristics of a target would lead a court to conclude that a party is
truly neutral. Basically, a target should be considered neutral when
it has not engaged in the conduct that spurred the boycott and does
not have the power to satisfy the boycotters' demands. 6 7 Since neutrality bestows upon a target a claim for governmental protection
that outweighs opposing free speech claims, the decisions in NOW'6 8
and Crown Central'69 deserve reexamination. In NOW, the targets

were primarily Missouri businessmen who operated convention facilities. 170 These targets were not boycotted because of sexually discriminatory policies or even for any stand they had taken on the issue at
166. That such a target deserves governmental protection has long been recognized
through the common law tort of interference. See supra notes 15-38, 160 and accompanying
text.
167. The idea that the target must have the power to respond to the grievance has been
embodied in a statute enacted for the purpose of prohibiting unfair boycotts. The Mississippi
statute prohibits boycotts when:
two (2) or more persons conspire to prevent another person or other persons from
trading or doing business with any merchant or other business and as a result of
said conspiracy said persons induce or encourage any individual or individuals to
cease doing business with any merchant or other person, and when such conspiracy
is formed and effectuated because of a reasonable grievance of the conspirators over
which the said merchant or place of business boycotted or against which a boycott is
attempted has no direct control or no legal authority to correct, or when the conspiracy results from such alleged grievance against the merchant or other person boycotted when no notice of such grievance has been given the merchant or party boycotted and no reasonable opportunity to correct such alleged grievance has been
given such merchant or other person against whom the conspiracy was formed
Miss. ANN. CODE § 97-23-85 (1972).
168. Missouri v. NOW, 620 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 842 (1980).
169. Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp. v. Waldman, 486 F. Supp. 759 (M.D. Pa.), rev'd on
other grounds, 634 F.2d 127 (3d Cir. 1980).
170. 620 F.2d at 1302.
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hand.1 71 Indeed, they may have even been staunch supporters of the
Equal Rights Amendment. That they were dragged into the middle
of a dispute over state policy gave them a claim for governmental
protection that negated the free speech claims of the boycotters.
Since free speech usually cannot legitimately be used as a shield for
secondary boycott activity, the Sherman Act (as well as common law
tort actions) should apply with full vigor.
This theory should apply with equal force to situations such as
occurred in Crown Central-boycotts of the public by suppliers of
goods and services aimed at spurring legislative action. In such a
situation, consumers who have no direct control over national legislative policy and indeed may have taken no stand concerning the matter are harmed by an economic action. Not only have the consumers
not taken the action that led to the dispute, but they are powerless to
take any action to bring it to an end.1 72 In addition, the ultimate
target in both NOW and Crown Central-governmental bodies---can
be reached via the ballot box, unlike commercial bodies, which can
be influenced only economically. Another factor weighing against defendants such as those in Crown Central is that boycotters who supply vital goods and services can cause far greater economic disruption than other special interest group boycotters. In fact, if boycotts
such as the one in Crown Central did become pervasive, the national
economy could suffer grievous losses. Thus, because of the secondary
nature of such actions and because of the potential for economic disruption they entail, boycotts by suppliers of goods and services
should be constitutionally enjoinable.
CONCLUSION

Where courts are asked to extend protection to targets under
the common law tort of interference, they are treading on familiar
ground because this tort action has always focused on the protection
of individual targets from undue economic restraints. 3 But where
courts are asked to accomplish the same task under federal or state
171.

NOW stipulated that it was boycotting all convention facilities located within

states that had not ratified the ERA. 467 F. Supp. 289, 291 (W.D. Mo. 1979).
172. While it may be argued that the consumers could bring an end to their distress by
enlisting in the boycotters' cause, this position is untenable. First, it is questionable whether
the affected consumers could always muster enough political support to bring about a change
in an important federal or state legislative policy. Second, it is abhorrent to our conception of
representative democracy to suggest as a viable alternative that citizens lobby for a program
they believe contrary to the public interest.
173. See supra notes 16-38 and accompanying text.
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antitrust laws, they find themselves dealing with a body of law that
has primarily sought to safeguard the public's interest in a competitive market rather than the private individual's property right in the
preservation of his business.1 74 In addition, the application of such
statutes has presented novel questions of constitutional law involving
the possible infringement of first amendment rights. When deciding
these constitutional questions, courts should look generally to modern constitutional doctrines concerning first amendment rights and
specifically to cases where analogous constitutional questions were
adjudicated. Where courts have not used this approach, anomalies
have occurred. Expressive conduct that would have been proscribed
at common law, and that the Supreme Court has held deserves no
constitutional protection in analogous circumstances, has been
granted broad immunity from the antitrust laws by some courts on
constitutional grounds. 17 5
At the other end of the spectrum, courts have taken positions
tending to concentrate on the economic aspects of such cases while
failing to assess fully the constitutional claims that have been
presented. 1 6 When regulatory policies clash with constitutional
rights, a careful balance must be reached between them. This balance, when being drawn in antitrust actions, cannot truly reflect the
competing interests involved unless there is a synthesis between the
body of law concerning antitrust and the common law sensitivity to
individual rights. With the target's interest in protection at the core
of a constitutional analysis, a more accurate assessment of the
boycotters' claims to constitutional protection can be attained.
Whether an action is brought against a group of noncommercial
boycotters under common law tort or under statutory antitrust laws,
the major question is the same: Can the government evince an interest in protecting the target strong enough to justify the resultant restriction on free speech? The traditional governmental interest in
preserving a competitive market is not particularly compelling in
these cases because of the inconsequential market affect that may
result from sporadic and isolated boycott efforts. And when the
boycotters are conducting their action against a primary target, in a
174. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.

175. See Missouri v. NOW, 620 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 842
(1980); Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp. v. Waldman, 486 F. Supp. 759 (M.D. Pa.), rev'd on
other grounds, 634 F.2d 127 (3d Cir. 1980).
176. See Osborn v. Pennsylvania-Delaware Serv. Station Dealers Ass'n, 499 F. Supp.
553 (D. Del. 1980).
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peaceful manner, and for a lawful purpose, they have a particularly
1 77
strong first amendment claim.
The constitutional balance shifts, however, when the target is
only tangentially related to the dispute, when the boycott is conducted by use of violence or threats, or when the boycotters seek to
force the target to take unlawful action. A target-based analysis provides an accommodation for the paramount needs of the adverse parties while fully comporting with modern constitutional doctrine.
Such an analysis will not protect a target from disputes that should
normally be anticipated by parties who make controversial decisions.
It will protect targets from being embroiled in others' disputes, from
having their markets cut off artificially through violent conduct, and
from being compelled to pursue a policy the state has declared
unlawful.
Laurence Paskowitz

177. In a recently decided case, the Supreme Court was highly critical of the use of
boycotts in a secondary context but did not pass on the question of whether boycotts may be a
constitutionally protected mode of expression in other circumstances. See International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Allied Int'l, Inc., 50 U.S.L.W. 4402 (U.S. Apr. 20, 1982) (No. 80-1663)
(holding that longshoremen's refusal to load Soviet ships, although politically motivated, could
constitutionally be proscribed as unlawful secondary boycott). The difference between boycotts
such as the one in Allied Internationaland primary boycotts engaged in wholly by consumers
is significant. Primary boycotts seek to harm no neutral party, and the target is not hindered in
its commerce with willing sellers and buyers. The Court's stated disdain of the ILA's boycott
as "conduct designed not to communicate but to coerce" and its emphasis on alternative means
of communication, id. at 4406, may suggest that the Court gives relatively little weight to
asserted first amendment claims in boycott cases. It seems clear that the Court was addressing
actions aimed at neutral parties, not boycotts of parties directly connected with the dispute. It
can be safely said that the Allied International opinion, while highly relevant to secondary
boycott claims, provides little guidance as to how the Court will deal with constitutional claims
by primary boycotters.
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